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TUAREG MILITANCY AND THE SAHELIAN SHOCK 
WAVES OF THE LIBYA REVOLUTION
Yvan Guichaoua1
The Sahara is neither a political void, nor an economic no man’s land. 
Its populations actively trade, share views and behavioural norms. The 
survival of these networks depends on relationships with regional state 
and nonstate actors, among whom Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s govern-
ment in Libya used to feature prominently. His government offered eco-
nomic support as well as political attention to Saharan communities. 
Qadhafi was driven by opportunism, yet his interventions provided 
some predictability to the vulnerable lives of Saharan communities.
 Qadhafi’s removal changed Saharan transnational political networks 
profoundly, and affected a system of governance involving heteroge-
neous actors, including Tuareg, Arab and Tebu but also Songhai, 
Hausa or Fulani communities, their nonstate armed protectors, as well 
as al-Qa’ida-affiliated armed groups originating in Algeria. Its echoes 
reverberated violently from Libya to Mali, then, after the French mili-
tary intervention there in early 2013, to Algeria—epitomised by the 
attack on a gas plant at In Amenas in January 2013, and Niger, where 
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deadly attacks hit Arlit and Agadez in May 2013. These attacks seem 
to have been perpetrated by groups relocated in southern Libya after a 
spell in Mali, indicating the continuing interpenetration of the Sahelian 
and North African spaces and their unfinished political reconfiguration 
since the Libyan Revolution.
 For the Tuareg communities in particular, the 2011 revolution in 
Libya created a complex chain of events that drew in their kin in 
Niger, and Mali.2 While many Sub-Saharan African migrants in Libya 
headed south to flee the combat zones,3 others, notably Tuareg fight-
ers from Niger and Mali, entered Libya to offer support to Colonel 
Qadhafi’s military campaign.4 When Qadhafi’s government was 
defeated, the same combatants eventually returned to their home coun-
tries along with other Tuareg who had settled in Libya previously, in 
turn triggering the collapse of northern Mali. A Tuareg separatist 
movement, the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad,5 MNLA), making extensive 
use of weapons and fighters from Libya, conducted a blitz offensive 
against Malian troops stationed in northern garrisons on 17  January 
2012, provoking a coup against President Toure in the south-based 
capital Bamako and the subsequent de facto secession of Mali’s north, 
roughly comprising two thirds of the national territory. But the MNLA 
ran out of resources soon after it declared the independence of Azawad 
on 6  April 2012, and was driven out by yet other recipients of Libyan 
weaponry,6 namely Mali-based Islamist groups closely connected to al-
Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).7 AQIM, a Jihadist outfit born 
out of a process of factionalisation among Islamist forces during the 
Algerian civil war in the nineties, had found shelter in north Mali in 
2003 and had enjoyed relative impunity since. Its local influence grew 
after it made the kidnapping of Westerners a prosperous money-mak-
ing industry. When MNLA forces swept north Mali and defeated the 
army, AQIM dismissed its nationalist stance, rallied Tuareg combat-
ants committed to Jihad and capitalised on anti-Tuareg sentiment 
among Songhai and Fulani northern communities. The Islamist coali-
tion eventually vanquished the MNLA and imposed a nine-month 
Islamic rule over north Mali before France launched a military inter-
vention to oust them.8
 The Libyan revolution gave its Malian Tuareg participants and their 
local nationalist counterparts the firepower they had previously lacked 
to destroy Bamako’s ‘hegemony on a shoestring’9 in northern Mali.10 
How do the stories of Libya and Mali intertwine?
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 This chapter firstly describes the long-lasting interconnectedness of 
the Tuareg Saharan political economy, perpetuated over centuries by 
long-distance travellers exchanging a wide range of licit and illicit com-
modities, building networks, accumulating social and financial capital, 
and, more recently, exploiting the economic and political opportunities 
afforded by Qadhafi in Libya. Secondly, the chapter details the interfer-
ence of Qadhafi’s regime with Niger and Mali’s management of domes-
tic Tuareg insurgencies. It then explains the Tuareg’s nuanced support 
of Qadhafi’s defence against the rebels’ offensive in this context.
Libya and the political economy of the Sahara
Moussa T.  is a young Tuareg I interviewed in May 2009 in Djanet,11 
in southeastern Algeria: 100km from the Tenere desert, Niger; 50km 
from Ghat, Libya. From October to April, Moussa is employed as a 
guide for tourists in the stunning scenery of the Tassili n’Ajjer, driving 
the 4x4 loaned to him by his boss Issouf H., a Tuareg travel agent 
from Niger who lives in Djanet. In the hot season, depending on the 
opportunities that arise, Moussa travels to Libya to buy spare parts for 
four-wheel drives, which he resells in Djanet, or in nearby Tamanrasset. 
When short of money, however, he organises convoys of sub-Saharan 
migrants wishing to enter Libya. Some of these migrants have been 
dropped at the Algerian border by Tuareg drivers from Niger after a 
long trip from Agadez. Others arrive in Tamanrasset first, via the min-
ing town Arlit and Tenere, before being driven to Djanet by Moussa 
or his friends. When numbers of migrants in Djanet are high enough, 
Moussa assembles large groups of them and guides them on foot on 
the long rocky trail towards Ghat. The three-day trek is dangerous, 
sometimes deadly, as ‘Africans don’t know how to walk in the rocks’ 
and cannot keep pace with their agile guide.
 Moussa is relatively young for a chifor (driver) and admits he could 
make much more money by transporting other ‘cargoes’ (chargements) 
instead of migrants or tourists. In Djanet’s economy, young chifors 
transport migrants when they lack the requisite experience and connec-
tions to transport arms or illicit drugs, which yield larger profits. Arms 
and drugs trafficking is controlled by a few politically connected 
patrons who own cars ‘as fast as little planes’, which cause amazement 
among those who see them pass by in the dunes. The two types of con-
voy—Moussa’s slower trucks, and the fast 4x4s of the narco- and arms 
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traffickers, indicate the two separate networks and economies that 
overlap in these same spaces.12 Entry into the most profitable segment 
of trade also faces a moral barrier: illicit drugs are forbidden by Islam 
(haram) and transporting them exposes traffickers to social stigma.13
 The geography dictates that arms and drug traffickers use few routes, 
the most well known of which is the ‘Salvador pass’, south of Djanet, a 
narrow corridor between the mountains bridging Libya and Niger. Most 
of the arms smuggled out of Libya during the 2011 civil war entered 
Niger there—as well as other goods, including construction material, to 
be sold in Agadez.14 The Salvador pass is also the point where Qadhafi’s 
former chief of intelligence Abdullah al-Sanusi left Libya in October 
2011, with the help of former Tuareg rebels from Niger.15
 While not rich, Moussa occasionally manages to save money, which 
he immediately invests in building a house, brick after brick, as a way 
to speed up his marital prospects. Moussa is better off than most of the 
other Tuareg young men that cross his path in Djanet. Every night, a 
large warehouse in Issouf’s family compound, which normally stores 
trekking equipment for tourists, hosts young Tuareg travellers heading 
to Libya to occupy seasonal jobs in gardens or construction sites, or 
returning to Niger. Issouf hardly knows them; they were recommended 
to him by common acquaintances.
 Djanet is a node of the trans-Saharan trade whose economic success 
largely depends on the activities in which Moussa and Issouf engage. 
Djanet is connected to other distant Saharan nodes similarly sustained 
by this transnational network of trade: Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao or 
In-Khalil in Mali; Agadez or In-Gall in Niger; Ghat, Awbari or Sabha 
in Libya. While the people and commodities travelling between these 
places change, the trading routes as well as the ‘connectivity’ that 
makes them parts of a coherent political economy are deeply rooted in 
history. Convoys of people (slaves, caravaners, migrants), animals 
(camels) and goods (gold, salt, textiles, cowries, tanned leather, dates 
and other foodstuff; more recently petrol, perfume, electric appliances, 
cigarettes, drugs, firearms) have been crossing the desert for centuries. 
Oases towns are inherently fragile ecologically; therefore trade connec-
tions are necessary for their survival.
 These trade connections have been sustained over the centuries by 
Islamic law and carefully maintained social capital. Trans-Saharan 
trade began well before the spread of Islam. But Islam, entering Africa 
in the seventh century, homogenised and strengthened the legal regu-
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lations governing long-distance commerce.16 Social capital, notably via 
marital strategies, and cosmopolitanism—that is, aptitude for naviga-
tion across diverse linguistic and institutional settings17—combined to 
ensure the cohesion of trading networks. Success was made sustainable 
through constantly negotiated alliances, and involved subtle social 
hierarchies. As a consequence, trans-Saharan trading networks tend to 
form a vast dynamic moral economy requiring careful maintenance.18
 Crucially, state actors—local customs officers as well as politicians—
play a role in this economy. An oft-observed truth of the Saharan polit-
ical economy was that for governments, controlling men is far more 
important than controlling territory. State officials’ activities thus 
ranged in scope from collecting bribes to running entire trafficking net-
works. The booming cigarettes trafficking between Niger and Libya in 
the 1990s was controlled by Libyans from the Qadhadhfa tribe, rais-
ing the strategic value of the connection between Libya and Niger19—
demonstrated later by Qadhafi’s officials’ choice to head to Niger at 
the end of the war.20 These examples, from Moussa to the Qadhafa, 
demonstrate that the Sahara is anything but the ‘ungoverned space’ 
classically conveyed by the Western media.21 How resilient this econ-
omy is to shocks such as the rise of narco-trafficking, the collapse of 
Qadhafi’s government in Libya and the subsequent Islamist takeover 
in Mali is explored further below.
 Libya’s importance in the Saharan economic space had mounted 
gradually since the 1960s. Pastoralism and long-distance caravanning, 
the traditional economic specialisations of the Tuareg, faltered under 
French colonial rule.22 After Mali and Niger became independent in 
1960, recurrent rebellions, the ensuing waves of state repression, the 
opening of new trading routes by air or sea, as well as droughts, accel-
erated the economic decline of their northern provinces.23 Tuareg 
rebellions hit Mali in 1963, the 1990s, 2006 and then again early 
2012. Niger witnessed two periods of rebellion, in the 1990s, then 
again between 2007 and 2009. These insurgencies took place in the 
backdrop of Tuaregs’ social and economic marginalisation in the post-
colonial power systems privileging southern elites in Bamako and 
Niamey, respectively. The response by Niger and Mali’s governments 
(including the use of violence) has varied greatly in the two countries. 
In 1963, during the first rebellion, Malian authorities used blind 
repression. The second rebellion in Mali also turned into bloody com-
munal violence perpetrated by proxy militias controlled by the govern-
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ment. Significant killings of Tuareg civilians were also perpetrated by 
governmental forces in Niger, such as the ‘Tchintabaraden massacre’ 
in 1990, leaving a durable imprint on collective memories and subse-
quent nationalist narratives. Successive peace deals were signed in the 
nineties in Niger and Mali but were poorly implemented, perpetuating 
resentment.
 This resulted in the disenfranchisement of large numbers of young 
Tuareg men, who, in response, migrated north to Algeria and Libya. 
Migration created a new trans-Saharan identity, that of the ishumar 
(from the French word chômeur, meaning unemployed). The ishumar 
were itinerant young men moving from one economic opportunity to 
the next. They began to question traditional tribal order, developed an 
ethos of solidarity and autonomy, and all the while tightened the social 
and economic connections in the towns between which they travelled. 
The globally acclaimed blues band Tinariwen sang a refrain 
‘Aujourd’hui je suis là mais demain je ne sais pas’ (‘Today I’m here, 
tomorrow I don’t know’), popularly sung among the ishumar, which 
essentially encapsulated their worldview and lifestyle.24
 Libya became the Eldorado of the ishumar and their remittances 
were a source of financial assistance for their relatives at home.25 While 
not offered full citizenship by the Libyan government—with the excep-
tion of some that became fighters in Qadhafi’s security forces—they 
could live and run businesses in Libya unhindered by the authorities.
 Ishumar were the forerunners of a larger wave of migration into 
Libya from sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, which they in turn sup-
ported as drivers. This wave of migration was largely demand-driven. 
Libya faced a labour shortage and was cash-rich, triggering demand 
for unskilled foreign workers.
 Hospitality towards Sub-Saharan Africans also stemmed from diplo-
matic considerations. Failed attempts at building pan-Arab solidarity, 
as well as diplomatic and economic isolation following the embargo 
declared after the Lockerbie attack in 1988, pushed Qadhafi’s govern-
ment to develop ties with sub-Saharan Africa. The process resulted in 
massive Libyan investments in diverse productive sectors of sub-Saha-
ran countries, as well as spectacular displays of generosity, such as 
Bamako’s Libya-funded administrative district, housing all of Mali’s 
main ministries and inaugurated in September 2010.26 These diplomatic 
efforts culminated in Qadhafi’s creation of the Community of Saharan 
and Sahelian States (CEN-SAD) in February 1998.27 CEN-SAD was a 
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free trade area initially founded by Libya and five Sahelian countries 
(Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Sudan and Chad), subsequently expanding 
to 28 members. One of its primary goals was to encourage the circula-
tion of people. CEN-SAD’s creation coincided with a spectacular 
increase in the proportion of sub-Saharan migrants working in Libya.
 But Qadhafi was careful not to make immigration irreversible. The 
migrants were closely monitored in the towns in which they registered 
to work. When domestic political or economic pressures dictated, 
migration could be curtailed. In 2004, for instance, 5,000 Nigeriens 
were expelled from Libya.28 Similarly, in the mid-2000s, Qadhafi 
 complied with the European Union’s new strategy for controlling 
immigration by allowing the guards from the EU agency Frontex to 
patrol its borders.
 Qadhafi’s Libya did not only enhance its political influence on the 
African continent through immigration policy and economic invest-
ments. Qadhafi also intervened directly in the national affairs of his 
neighbours, as epitomised by his mediation of the recurrent Tuareg 
rebellions in Niger and Mali. The political capital accrued in these 
interventions, would translate into ready Tuareg military support to 
Qadhafi at the onset of the 2011 uprising.29
Qadhafi’s role in shaping Tuareg regional politics
Libyan support for Tuareg rebellion in the Sahel is not new. During 
World War I, the Tuareg leader Kaocen united several Tuareg tribes 
from the Aïr region, north of Agadez in Niger, and challenged the 
French colonisers militarily with the support of the Cyrenaica-based 
Sanusi order, which shared control of what is now Libya with the 
Ottomans.30 Kaocen’s alliance with Cyrenaica was the first example of 
what became a recurrent feature of Tuareg rebellions’—their using for-
eign alliances to gain advantage in local power struggles. In this way, 
Qadhafi’s apparently whimsical agenda simply fitted a preexisting 
political dynamic.
 In the 1970s, Qadhafi recognised a political opportunity in the dis-
enfranchised young Tuaregs fleeing droughts and political repression 
in Niger and Mali. Posturing as a flag-bearer of a revolutionary, anti-
imperial struggle, he created the Islamic Legion in 1979, an auxiliary 
armed group that enlisted up to 8,000 combatants from Egypt, Sudan, 
Niger and Mali. This force served in various and generally disastrous 
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military campaigns in Chad, Uganda and Lebanon.31 It also served 
domestic purposes, since unlike the regular army, it was exclusively 
dedicated to Qadhafi’s protection and safeguarding him against poten-
tial military coups.32
 Testimonies and narratives of Tuareg ex-combatants acknowledge 
the Islamic Legion played a central role in the rebellions that hit Niger 
and Mali in the early 1990s. Most veteran rebels of the 1990s I inter-
viewed since 2007 root the immediate causes of the insurgency in the 
economic and political marginalisation of the Tuareg after indepen-
dence but insist that its military translation was permitted by the expe-
rience of combat acquired under Qadhafi’s auspices, as part of the 
Islamic Legion. In the eyes of the Tuareg who stayed in Niger and Mali 
at the time, the rebellions were started by ‘Libyans’.33 Most Tuareg 
leaders of those rebellions had fought in the Islamic Legion in the hope 
that Qadhafi would support their struggle in turn. This tacit promise 
was not fulfilled, however, as Qadhafi wanted to avoid a direct con-
frontation with Libya’s neighbours. This created resentment among 
Tuareg rebels, who, in the 1990s, fought the central authorities of Mali 
and Niger ‘without a single bullet from Qadhafi’,34 relying instead on 
arms raided from Malian and Nigerien military depots. Qadhafi’s rela-
tionship with the Malian and Nigerien Tuareg therefore was ambigu-
ous: the Tuareg had developed relatively commercial prosperous 
exchanges thanks to Libya’s openness yet these ties enhanced Qadhafi’s 
capacity to manipulate Tuareg political aspirations and militancy.
 In the 1990s, Qadhafi offered Tuareg rebels sanctuary in Libya to 
organise and was, a decade later, instrumental in negotiating a cease-
fire between the rebels and Mali and Niger. Qadhafi became the medi-
ator of the regional tensions he had fuelled, garnering him interna-
tional legitimacy in the region. Qadhafi held this position because of 
Libya’s economic regional power. He could negotiate an end to fight-
ing by coopting rebel leaders and promising military integration to 
their followers; he could also sponsor longer-term post-conflict poli-
cies aimed at preventing the resumption of conflicts such as the UNDP-
run Programme de Consolidation de la Paix dans l’Aïr et l’Azawak 
(Programme for Peace Consolidation in the Aïr and the Azawak, 
PCPAA) in Niger in 2005 aimed at turning ex-combatants into small 
entrepreneurs. By doing so, Qadhafi became a crucial power-broker 
between the weak governments of Niger and Mali, and the armed 
actors in the remote periphery of their national territory.35 The differ-
 HEADER TOO LONG
  329
ent ways in which these political processes unfolded had direct conse-
quences for the Tuareg’s positions in the 2011 revolution in Libya.
Libya and the Tuareg rebellion in Niger (2007–9)36
On 9  February 2007, the military post of Iferouane, located in the 
north of Agadez, was attacked by armed men claiming affiliation to a 
new movement: the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la justice (Nigerien 
Movement for Justice, MNJ). This was the start of a two-year rebel-
lion based primarily in the Aïr Mountains, led by Aghaly Alambo, a 
mid-ranking officer of the Front de libération de l’Aïr et de l’Azawak 
(FLAA), the leading insurgent movement of the 1990s. After his time 
in the FLAA, Alambo took on the position of sous-préfet in Iferouane, 
north of Agadez, and ran a profitable travel agency—a business often 
associated with cross-border trafficking. Allegedly, Alambo took the 
leadership of the MNJ because of the involvement of his brother, an 
army deserter, in the MNJ’s first attack, which made him a wanted 
man. His reputation as a brave combatant of the late FLAA and the 
early death in combat of the charismatic Capitaine Acharif ensured he 
was not initially challenged.
 Within a few months, the MNJ amassed over a thousand combat-
ants. The MNJ denounced the unfulfilled promises of the peace agree-
ments signed in the late 1990s, which called for the economic develop-
ment of Agadez and its region, greater regional autonomy through 
decentralisation and an ambitious programme of integration of ex-
combatants in national security forces and public administration. The 
MNJ also demanded better redistribution of wealth from uranium 
mining, Niger’s principal source of government revenues, which is 
extracted in Arlit, north of Agadez.
 By late 2009, however, the MNJ had collapsed, due not only to 
exhaustion of resources but also a Libyan intervention, which con-
sisted in coopting part of the MNJ leadership into a new faction that 
accepted disarming. We detail below how Libyan authorities were 
instrumental in the launch as well as the demise of the MNJ.
 In 2005, France, the US, and Libya sponsored the PCPAA, an eco-
nomic package that was negotiated in the 1990s peace agreement 
between the Nigerien government and the Tuareg rebels. Coordinated 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), PCPAA sup-
ported 3,000 ex-combatants in starting micro-enterprises.37 Also in 
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2005, Libya, as a favour to the Nigerien authorities, arranged resi-
dence permits and positions in the Libyan security forces for 500 ex-
combatants of the FLAA.38 But the Libyan efforts—along with those 
of other donors—proved inadequate. The PCPAA started late and 
offered too little (typically small onion-growing businesses) to its recip-
ients, who rejected the strictly economic scheme. Similarly, the infor-
mal integration process of ex-combatants into the Libyan and Nigerien 
armed forces, and its overreliance on the discretionary power of FLAA 
leaders, proved unworkable as too many FLAA combatants ended up 
side-lined. It was eventually ex-FLAA members who triggered the next 
rebellion in 2007, choosing Alambo to lead them and rebranding their 
movement MNJ.
 MNJ’s low-intensity guerrilla war ensued, logistically supported 
from Algerian and Libyan territory. Unable to handle the situation, 
Nigerien authorities appealed again to Qadhafi, who, in 2009, sum-
moned the MNJ leaders to Tripoli. The negotiation degenerated into 
bargaining, in which the end of hostilities was simply bought for cash.
 This buyoff factionalised the Nigerien Tuareg militants into three 
main groups. Two new groups split off from the MNJ: the Front des 
Forces de Redressement (FFR) and the Front Patriotique Nigérien 
(FPN). The cause of the breakdown was not ideological but stemmed, 
instead, from personal rivalries among the leaders driven by Libya’s 
intervention. Parochial, self-interested considerations replaced the orig-
inal nationalist claims and killed the insurgency.
 The FPN tried to claim priority access to the funds offered by 
Qadhafi. Meanwhile Alambo, the MNJ president, negotiated with 
Libyan authorities on behalf of the MNJ.  The prospects of the MNJ at 
the time are summarised by a MNJ fighter: ‘our resources were 
exhausted and we were tired. The best thing to do was to sell our 
rebellion at a good price. Alambo obtained a good price and the great 
bulk of the combatants supported his option.’39 According to the same 
combatant, the negotiated payment only covered disarmament. A sec-
ond phase, consisting of employment for ex-combatants, was expected, 
but never transpired as Qadhafi was toppled in 2011.
 Even the disarmament process did not run smoothly, as low-level 
fighters accused their leaders of deceit. According to ex-combatants 
interviewed in March 2012, they only received payment of $1,000 in 
Sabha, southern Libya just prior to returning to Niger, instead of the 
$6,000 payment per combatant it was rumoured the leaders received 
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from Qadhafi. With no documentation of the agreement there was no 
way of verifying the claims. Rumour became fact and Alambo was dis-
avowed by many MNJ members and his house in Agadez ransacked. 
Alambo stayed in Tripoli, under Qadhafi’s protection, until the revo-
lution kicked off.
 In 2011, Alambo became a recruiter for Tuareg fighters for 
Qadhafi’s security brigades. In an interview given in Niamey in 
September 2011, Alambo narrates how, in June of the same year, he 
was asked by Qadhafi to help him fight the rebels.40 Endowed with 
Qadhafi’s resources, Alambo activated some of his loyal MNJ ties to 
recruit some of his past followers as fighters to Libya. This recruitment 
drive lasted approximately two months and was supplemented by 
spontaneous volunteers from disenfranchised MNJ ex-combatants. 
Some of those former MNJ combatants interviewed in Niamey in 
March 2012 described both routes: ‘The first option consisted in rid-
ing to Djanet from Arlit with smugglers. Then from Djanet I would go 
to Ghat, Awbari or Sabha and find a welcoming brigade there; there 
were plenty of them and it was easy to find a relative with whom to 
travel at no expense.’ Alambo’s system, by contrast, was far more 
organised. ‘The second option consists in joining one of the periodical 
convoys leaving the Aïr Mountains. What you need to know is when 
it leaves; then you just show up and everything is taken care of: food 
and transport.’
 No more than a few hundreds41 of fighters from Niger—some of 
whom had remained in Libya as ishumar for years—fought for 
Qadhafi, partly out of sympathy for the man who made Libya an eldo-
rado for the young Tuaregs, partly for the money, but also for the guns 
and other items they expected to bring (and sell) when returning home. 
Testimonies of their experience as mercenaries are scarce because inter-
viewees were reticent to be associated with the fallen leader. Those that 
did talk were bitter. An elderly veteran of the Tuareg rebellions in 
Niger told the magazine Jeune Afrique that he and around 200 other 
men left Agadez in 2011, after a call from Aghaly Alambo, in the hope 
of making 5,000 Euros. They, and those others who survived, came 
back with nothing.42
 Alambo’s last feat of assistance to Qadhafi was to facilitate the 
escape of senior government figures through Niger in early September 
2011 with the support of Nigerien authorities,43 who only required 
that they disarm on entry. Ali Qana, Qadhafi’s Tuareg military com-
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mander of the southern zone was among those Alambo helped smug-
gle south. The Niger government’s support may have been a result of 
past allegiances but one may conjecture it was also tolerated, if not 
arranged, by the French government in order to accelerate the fall of 
the Libyan government. Providing further evidence to this suggestion, 
Niger issued a diplomatic passport to Bashir Saleh, Qadhafi’s former 
chief of staff and head of the Libya African Investment Portfolio aide 
in financial matters, who despite being wanted by Interpol resided in 
France until early 2012, when he was allowed to flee, when opinion 
and media pressure for his arrest mounted.44
 Alambo himself became special adviser to Amadou Hama, President 
of the Niger National Assembly. The agreement granted Alambo state 
protection and, for Niger authorities, it kept a potentially dangerous 
troublemaker in check. This (provisionally?) put an end to Alambo’s 
privileged venture with Qadhafi’s inner circles.
 The 2011 revolution affected the personal trajectories of Nigerien 
Tuareg ishumar and fighters, and temporarily distorted the economy 
of northern Niger’s Agadez region. Yet unlike Mali, the integrity of the 
Nigerien territory was left relatively unscathed. In Niger, the structural 
imbalances between northern and southern Niger are less pronounced 
than in Mali. Secondly, the history of violence between Malian Tuareg 
rebels, the Malian army and its allies was far more severe than in 
Niger.45 Thirdly, AQIM’s presence in northern Mali inflamed political 
tensions and relations between communities. Fourthly, a high concen-
tration of disputes over the control of narco-trafficking from West 
Africa through Mali to the Mediterranean coast made northern Mali 
particularly vulnerable to resumption of violence and state collapse. 
Finally, the number of Malian Tuaregs enrolled in Qadhafi’s security 
brigades stationed in Sabha or Awbari, which were compelled to leave 
Libya following Qadhafi’s fall, significantly exceeded those of Nigerien 
Tuaregs.46 As a consequence, the aftermath of the Libyan revolution 
only exacerbated an already deteriorating political situation in north-
ern Mali.
The MNLA’s Libyan connection
Between 2006 and 2009—almost concomitantly with the MNJ in 
Niger—a young Tuareg officer, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, led a low-inten-
sity guerrilla war in Kidal, Mali’s most northern province. Ag Bahanga, 
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was a mid-ranking Malian army officer, an ex-rebel of the 1990s, who 
was then integrated into the Malian army. Despite being uneducated 
and not particularly articulate, his military prowess and charisma 
made him a potent leader. As in Niger, the poorly implemented peace 
agreements and integration programmes for Tuareg ex-combatants 
into the regular army, as well as rivalries between Tuareg groups 
treated differently by the regime, produced a renewed wave of insur-
gency. However, Ag Bahanga, unlike Alambo, refused to be bought. 
Despite signing a peace accord under Algerian auspices, he and his men 
fled north, becoming ‘social bandits’, righting wrongs by attacking 
army posts and drug convoys (a trade largely controlled at the time by 
specific Arab clans in the Gao region). The state armed local militias 
in response. Composed of fighters belonging to subaltern communities 
of northern Mali, including Arabs, Tuaregs, Fulanis and Songhaïs, 
these militias successfully pushed Ag Bahanga into exile into Libya in 
early 2009. He and his men remained there until the outbreak of fight-
ing in Libya in 2011.
 Libya’s 17  February Revolution presented Ag Bahanga with an 
opportunity to recruit fighters to return to Mali.47 Instead of becoming 
Qadhafi’s recruiter, Ag Bahanga initiated talks between the young 
activists in Mali that in his absence had formed the separatist 
Mouvement National de l’Azawad (National Movement of Azawad or 
MNA) and Malian Tuareg soldiers serving in Libyan security brigades 
in southern Libya. These units were headed by Mohamed Ag Najim. 
Ag Najim’s father had been killed by the Malian military in the Adagh 
Mountains (Kidal province) in 1963. He typified the kind of dedicated 
Saharan combatants that Qadhafi had recruited into the Islamic 
Legions and later the mostly Tuareg Maghawir brigade.
 Ag Bahanga, his men in Mali and those he managed to convince in 
Libya, frantically transported military equipment, cars or petrol from 
Ag Najim’s open stockpiles, into Mali, via Algeria and Niger in July 
and August 2011. The armaments that crossed the borders included 
AK47s, grenades, mounted machine-guns, vehicles,48 but also anti-tank 
missiles, rocket launchers and MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense 
Systems, equipped with SA-7 or SA-24 missiles).49 Strikingly, the con-
stant long-distance travels back and forth of convoys of arms between 
Libya and Mali were hardly stoppable. Although governmental author-
ities of Niger made some sporadic arrests, these interdictions were 
more often provoked by self-interested coincidental denunciation than 
rigorous and permanent monitoring of the borders.50
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 The product of Ag Bahanga’s hectic networking between the Mali-
based youth activists of the MNA and Ag Najim’s fighters became the 
Mouvement national de liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) formed in late 
2011, soon after Ag Bahanga’s accidental death in a car crash in 
August 2011. The MNLA first hit the Malian army on 17  January 
2012 in Menaka, in the Gao region, with a firepower no Tuareg rebel-
lion in the past had managed to gather. The Malian army did not resist 
the offensive and AQIM units as well as local government-sponsored 
proxy militias that had ousted Ag Bahanga in 2009 were forced to 
reconfigure their complex alliances.
 The MNLA’s original attack was only the first in a series of events 
that dramatically changed the Saharan political landscape. Using 
French-based media and articulate Paris-based propagandists, the 
MNLA postured as a pro-West, anti-AQIM, secular force, in the hope 
of receiving support from France and other Western powers. The sup-
port did not come; the MNLA’s pro-West extraversion tactic failed 
and its resources shrank. At the same time, AQIM, whose bases were 
located in northern Mali, managed to capitalise on the anti-MNLA 
sentiment among northern non-Tuareg communities (Songhaï, Fulanis 
or Arabs). After the rout of the Malian army, the rule of northern Mali 
was contested by the MNLA and an Islamist coalition whose backbone 
was formed by AQIM cells. And it is the Islamists who eventually won.
 They took control of northern Mali through a formidable reversal 
of alliances, as influential, formerly state-sponsored non-Tuareg mili-
tias and youth groups present in the northern cities of Gao and 
Timbuktu aligned with what they considered the lesser of two evils. 
The inclusive discourse of Islam and the harshness of Islamist groups 
against criminals were preferred to the nationalist stance of the MNLA 
and its inability to discipline troublesome—when not criminal—fol-
lowers. AQIM’s other master strategic move consisted in coopting Iyad 
Ag Ghaly, a former prominent Tuareg nationalist rebel. Ag Ghaly had 
followed a personal trajectory towards Salafism and his leadership was 
dismissed by younger activists in the consultative process that led to 
the formation of the MNLA.  Ag Ghaly’s later alliance with AQIM 
marked his revenge against those who had sidelined him and incapac-
itated the MNLA in its opposition to AQIM, as confronting Ag Ghaly 
would have triggered deadly internecine conflicts and annihilated the 
chance of actualising the project of an independent Azawad.
 The intention of the Islamists to push their territorial control further 
south in January 2013 triggered an immediate and heavy French mili-
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tary reaction. At time of writing in late 2013, the military operation 
under way, followed by a large UN-sponsored deployment, are argu-
ably another unexpected and distant side-effect of the collapse of 
Qadhafis’ regime and NATO’s military intervention, but perhaps not 
the last.
Concluding remarks
None of the Sahelian shockwaves of the revolution in Libya have yet 
produced stable, predictable prospects for communities living in the 
Sahara. Militarisation of the desert by external forces has been the 
response offered so far by international powers, fearing the spread of 
Jihadism. The overwhelming macro-cleavage of the war on terror 
leaves little chance for the fragile moral economy that once character-
ised trans-Saharan exchanges to rebuild.
